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RESTRICTING RICO: NARROWING
THE SCOPE OF ENTERPRISE
INTRODUCTION
Passed in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act,
the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)1 affords prosecutors a new means of attacking organized
crime and sophisticated criminal syndicates. Unlike traditional
law enforcement measures that focused solely on the acts
committed, RICO attacks the organization itself. To secure a
criminal conviction, prosecutors must prove both a "pattern of
racketeering activity" and an "enterprise.''2 An enterprise is
defined as any legal entity (such as a corporation) or informal
association-in-fact.3
However, the broad language in the statute allows prosecu-
tors to apply RICO to loosely-affiliated criminal groups, so-called
"illicit associations-in-fact." In particular, § 1962(c) prohibits
persons "employed by or associated with any enterprise," includ-
ing a handful of small-time criminals, from participating in the
affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.4 This provision of the statute thus allows broad appli-
cation of RICO to persons other than traditional organized
criminals. Despite the lesser threat they present, members of
such illicit associations-in-fact still face RICO's heightened
penalties for activities punishable under existing state or federal
law.
This article focuses on the enterprise element of RICO
which permits expansive application of criminal RICO - partic-
ularly associations-in-fact - beyond the policies and purposes
underlying the statute. Despite RICO's broad definition of
enterprise, courts should construe associations-in-fact narrowly
'Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1991)).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). These "substantive" provisions of
RICO do not criminalize previously legal acts. Instead, the statute provides
that if a person commits two or more "predicate acts" (all of which are illegal
under either state or federal law), a "pattern of racketeering activity" may be
established. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). When this pattern is coupled in some
form with an enterprise, prosecutors may secure significantly greater sanc-
tions and penalties.
3 Id. § 1961(4).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
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in order to promote a reasoned application of the statute.
Moreover, Congress should relieve courts from having to choose
between applying RICO literally and applying it sensibly by
amending its. definition to attack the statute's true
target: organized crime.
Part I describes the overbreadth problem as created by
Congress and perpetuated by the courts. Section A discusses
RICO generally to provide a framework for the article.5 In
Section B, an exploration of Congress' focus on organized
crime - not loosely-affiliated criminals - highlights the rift
between RICO's statutory language and its legislative history.
Section C examines judicial application of the association-in-fact
concept and concludes that courts have interpreted RICO too
broadly. Section D discusses different judicial attempts to
restrict RICO to illicit associations-in-fact and congressional
efforts to revise RICO.
Part II considers the "enterprise" concept from a policy
perspective and sets forth recommendations for Congress, the
courts, and prosecutors. Section A provides a framework for the
prescription by clarifying the concept of association-in-fact.
Section B discusses the roles and functions of the enterprise
requirement, concluding that enterprise is important because of
what it achieves, not because of what it means. Section C
advances public policy arguments in favor of strictly construing
associations-in-fact when dealing with defendants not tradition-
ally considered organized criminals. Section D explains what
prosecutors, courts and Congress should do to restrict RICO's
breadth by limiting enterprise. Congress must intervene and
modify the definition of association-in-fact to apply only to
organized criminals.
I. DESCRIPTION OF RICO - WHAT CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS HAVE DONE
A. THE RICO STATUTE
RICO attacks organized crime in a novel way by focusing on
the concept of enterprise rather than either the commission of
acts or explicit agreements among criminals. RICO allows
private civil actions and treble damages for violations of the
statute. The statute initially sets forth the terms essential to
'This article focuses on criminal, not civil RICO.
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its application. RICO defines "racketeering activity" exclusively
by the delineation of numerous state and federal criminal
offenses.6 Prosecutors must allege the commission of at least
two "predicate acts" within ten years of each other in order to
establish the necessary "pattern of racketeering activity" to
convict a defendant.'
RICO defines "enterprise" as any legal entity, such as a
corporation, partnership, or individual, or "any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."8
This broad definition of enterprise permits prosecutors to attack
both legitimate entities, such as businesses, and wholly criminal
associations. Enterprise provides the focus for RICO prosecu-
tions because it allows the targeting of an organization in
addition to the alleged predicate acts. Lastly, RICO defines
"1person" as any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property,9 which is important because
RICO's substantive provisions are directed at "persons."
Section 1962 describes the "predicate acts." First, § 1962(a)
prohibits investing in a legitimate business with money earned
from a pattern of illegal activities. Similarly, § 1962(b) prohib-
its acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The latter section
targets acquisition of an enterprise through unlawful means,
whereas § 1962(a) regulates investment that would be lawful
but for the illicit source of the funds. These two provisions
generally apply where the enterprise is a legal entity, most
commonly a business or labor organization.
Section 1962(c), the most controversial substantive provision
of the statute, prohibits anyone "employed by or associated with
any enterprise from conducting or participating in the conduct"
of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1991). The proscribed racketeering activities
include violent crimes such as murder, arson, and kidnapping; crimes involv-
ing illicit goods and services, such as narcotics, pornography, and counterfeit-
ing; crimes involving payments and loans to labor organizations; and commer-
cial fraud, including securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). This ten year period excludes any time for
imprisonment. Although RICO only requires "at least two acts of racketeering
activity," the Supreme Court has suggested that more than two acts are
required. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989);
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
9 Id. § 1961(3).
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activity. Unlike the previous two provisions, § 1962(c) address-
es the uses of the enterprise concept. This provision applies to
both legitimate and illicit enterprises, although the person-
enterprise rule limits its application to the former.'" Applied
to an illicit association-in-fact, the section prohibits that enter-
prise - the group of criminal "confederates" - from engaging
in the proscribed pattern of racketeering activity. This provi-
sion can be recklessly applied to illicit associations-in-fact
because, in many cases, the prosecutor defines the enterprise
not by its structure, but by the acts constituting the pattern.
RICO provides virtually no limitation as to whom may be
prosecuted if the pattern and enterprise elements exist."
Convictions under RICO result in imprisonment of up to 20
years in addition to heavy fines.'2 The statute also authorizes
criminal forfeiture of both the interest in the enterprise and any
proceeds derived from the pattern of racketeering activity. 3
This forfeiture provision is a valuable tool not usually available
in traditional efforts to attack crime. This basic framework
should assist the reader to understand the use of enterprise in
criminal prosecutions against illicit associations-in-fact.
B. RIFT BETWEEN TERMS OF STATUTE AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
RICO clearly applies to illicit associations-in-fact, regardless
of whether the association is a well-organized criminal syndicate
or a loosely-organized group of criminals. The statute provides
no clear limitation on the scope of enterprise." An association-
10 Followed by a majority of circuits, the person-enterprise rule requires
that the enterprise be distinct from the culpable "person employed by or
associated with any enterprise." In other words, where legitimate entities are
involved, the defendant cannot be both the person and enterprise under
§ 1962(c). See Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991). But
see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984).
" Potential limits on criminal prosecutions are set out in the Department
of Justice Guidelines for RICO cases. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATToRNEYs' MANUAL §§ 9-110.000 to -111.700 (1990) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
12 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
13 Id.
14 Lynch acknowledges the broad reach of RICO's terms:
RICO could be read as imposing drastic sanctions not only on the
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in-fact is delineated, in large part, by the predicate acts that its
members commit. If courts find an association-in-fact enterprise
in every pattern, then ordinary criminals will fall as squarely
within the statutory coverage as the organized criminals whom
RICO sought to constrain.
The legislative history of RICO, however, suggests that
RICO's chief proponents intended to limit the statute's reach to
traditional organized crime. Although Congress did not explicit-
ly reject the application of RICO to ad hoc conspiracies, it did
not exhibit great concern about federalizing small-time crimi-
nals. Regardless of how Congress ultimately approached the
problem, congressional proceedings and studies suggest that the
chief concern was the organization behind organized crime.
Bills proposed prior to RICO's passage bolster this conclu-
sion. In 1965, Senator John McLellan introduced Senate Bill
2187,15 which sought to prohibit membership in organized
crime generally, and particularly in the Mafia. Although Con-
gress took no action on Senate Bill 2187, due in part to doubts
infiltration of legitimate business by organized criminals and on the
operation of legitimate business in a criminal manner by anyone at
all, but also on the operation of organized crime itself. And indeed,
since the statute's working definition of organized crime is found
only in the expansive definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern of
racketeering," the statute so read would apply not only to La Cosa
Nostra, but to any group of individuals banded together into an
"associat[ion] in fact" to commit any of the wide range of crimes
defined by § 1961(1) as "typical of organized crime."
Gerald E. Lynch, The Crime of Being a Criminal, Part I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 684-85 (1987).
15 S. 2187, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). In principal part, S. 2187 reads:
Whoever... after the date of enactment... knowingly ... becomes
or remains a member of (1) the Mafia, or (2) any other organization
having for one of its purposes... violation[s] of the criminal laws
... relating to gambling, extortion, blackmail, narcotics, prostitu-
tion, or labor-racketeering, with knowledge of the purpose of such
organization, shall be guilty of a felony ....
Id. § 2(a).
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about its constitutionality, 6 § 1962(c) incorporated much of the
spirit of this bill. 7
Following the 1967 report of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 18 Senator
Roman Hruska proposed two bills addressing the infiltration of
legitimate organizations by organized crime. Senate Bill
2048"9 would have outlawed the investment of certain unre-
ported income to "establish or operate" business enterprises, and
Senate Bill 204920 would have prohibited participants in cer-
tain crimes from investing their proceeds in "any business
enterprise., 21 Shortly thereafter, Hruska proposed Senate Bill
1623,22 which adopted the key features of the prior bills, in-
cluding use of the term "business enterprise.
23
The Commission Report supports the proposition that
Congress limited its focus to organized criminal syndicates. One
of the cornerstones of the Report was sociologist Donald
Cressey's analysis of the nature of criminal organizations.
Cressey's observation that an "organized criminal" is one who
has committed a crime while occupying an organizational
position for committing that crime2' bolsters the argument that
Congress was not concerned with loosely confederated criminal
activities.
16 S. 2187 facially appeared to criminalize status rather than conduct. In
addition, critics expressed concern about the risk of guilt by association, the
hazards of "large mass conspiracy trials," and the fear that evidence of the
Mafia as an entity could inherently prejudice defendants. See Michael
Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerald E. Lynch,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 783 n.72 (1988).
17 According to Michael Goldsmith, RICO created an indirect way of
attacking organized crime through pattern and enterprise, rather than
unconstitutionally prohibiting membership in the Mafia. Id. at 784.
" Donald R. Cressey, The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates,
in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 25-60 (1967).
19 S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967).
20 S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1967).
21 See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 777.
2 S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969).
z See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 777.
Cressy, supra note 18, at 59. Cressey sought to attack organized crime
(while avoiding S. 2187's shortcomings) by "[d]efining illicit business in
organizational terms" and making "participation in such divisions of labor a
violation of criminal law." Id. at 57.
RESTRICTING RICO's ENTERPRISE
Perhaps this gap between legislative intent and the lan-
guage of RICO is a result of the different opinions the statute's
drafters attempted to incorporate. Viewing the statute as a
political compromise, however, is erroneous. Instead, RICO's
curious approach is attributable to the difficulty in defining
organized crime. Because Congress could not simply outlaw
membership in a criminal organization, Congress defined
organized crime in terms of conduct: the commission of predi-
cate acts.2 The enterprise concept served the purpose of limit-
ing the application of RICO to situations where an entity was
exploited or created to commit the predicate acts. Because
Congress did not tailor this enterprise element narrowly, courts
applying RICO have extended it far beyond its intended
purposes.
C. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF "ENTERPRISE" TO
ASSOCIATIONS-IN-FACT
This section examines judicial treatment of § 1961(4) "asso-
ciations-in-fact." Early case law addressing the scope of illicit
associations-in-fact construed RICO broadly, including a signifi-
cant amount of criminal activity within its reach. For example,
the Fifth Circuit in Unitdd States v. Elliot2 upheld the district
court's finding of an association-in-fact comprised of several
defendants who combined to commit various crimes. The
predicate offenses included arson, murder, counterfeiting titles
for stolen cars, stealing a truckload of Hormel meat and other
assorted goods, and attempting to influence the outcome of a
trial."7 The government named six defendants, each of whom
participated in all or some of the predicate offenses. Defendants
argued on appeal that the crimes did not further the affairs of
an "enterprise," since the defendants committed only isolated
criminal acts without formal agreement or structure.28  Al-
"[RICO] implicitly defined organized crime by what it did rather than by
what it was, by listing a variety of crimes to which the prohibitions of the act
applied." See Lynch, supra note 14, at 683.
26 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
27 Id. at 884-95.
' As the court noted: "According to the defendants, what we are dealing
with is a leg, a tail, a trunk, an ear - separate entities unaffected by RICO's
proscriptions. The government asserts ... that we have come eyeball to
eyeball with a single creature of behemoth proportions." Id. at 884.
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though they broke the law, they did not do so as an enterprise,
but rather as a collection of individuals who occasionally acted
in concert.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, likening the confederation of
criminals to a "large business conglomerate."29 The common
thread tying the alleged activities together "was the desire to
make money."30 An enterprise, according to the court, can be
a wholly illicit organization, one with "an amoeba-like infra-
structure that controls a secret criminal network."'" After
noting that RICO does not target "sporadic activity" but rather
"highly sophisticated" organized crime, 2 the court held that
the prosecution had proven "the existence of an enterprise - a
myriopod criminal network, loosely connected but connected
nonetheless. '" 3' Despite its discussion of the limited purposes
of RICO, the court applied the statute to a loosely-organized
"confederation" of criminals, precisely the type of loose organiza-
tion punishable under existing law. The Fifth Circuit further
underscored the expansive scope of enterprise and its role in
RICO prosecutions, noting that "the RICO net is woven tightly
to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with
the enterprise.""
In 1981, the Supreme Court issued the seminal decision
defining associations-in-fact. In United States v. Turkette,35
the Court defined an association-in-fact as a "group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a
' Id. at 898. The court, "metaphorically speaking," referred to one
defendant as "chairman of the board," and noted the presence of executive
committees in charge of counterfeit titles/amphetamine sales and thefts from
interstate commerce. Id. This approach is correct, except that the court
inferred more structure and organization into the defendants' affairs than
actually existed.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Similarly, the court started its opinion by addressing the threat caused
"when groups of people, through division of labor, specialization, diversifica-
tion, complexity of organization, and the accumulation of capital, turn crime
into an ongoing business." Id. at 884. Strangely enough, it seems difficult to
characterize the activity engaged in by the Elliot defendants as evidencing the
above criteria.
" Id. at 899.
34 Id. at 903.
452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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course of conduct. ' 6 According to the Court, in order to prove
an association-in-fact, the government must present evidence of
"an ongoing organization, formal or informal," and evidence that
"the various associates function as a continuing unit. 37 The
Court emphasized that although the proof used to establish the
separate elements of pattern and enterprise could coalesce,
"proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. 3'  By
stressing that pattern and enterprise are distinct elements of a
RICO offense, the Court sought to assuage fears that applying
§ 1962(c) to illegitimate associations would cause the two
requirements to collapse into one another.39
Turkette's facts, however, suggest that the Court did allow
the two elements to blend together.4" The government alleged
four arson schemes, in two of which Turkette hired his acquain-
tance Landers, to burn down houses in return for a fee. In the
other two, Turkette arranged to burn two cars so that he and an
associate could recover insurance proceeds. Different partici-
pants figured in each act of arson.41 Turkette and several
others, including Landers, also robbed pharmacies and distrib-
uted the drugs they stole. Only Landers and Turkette partici-
pated in any of the arson schemes. Although Turkette was
clearly a criminal, his "enterprise" or criminal gang consisted of
a group of people with whom he committed crimes, with no
systematic overlap of members. Turkette and his "associates"
clearly were not organized criminals, and it is not clear how
they constituted an illicit association-in-fact when they lacked
true continuity or structure.
The Supreme Court adopted the Thrkette test to restrict the
potentially limitless application of RICO to criminal associa-
36 Id. at 583. This definition applies to both legitimate and illicit associa-
tions-in-fact.
3 7 id.
38 Id.
" But see David Vitter, The RICO Enterprise as Distinct from the Pattern
of Racketeering Activity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419,
1424 (1988) ("In rejecting the view that [pattern and enterprise] are the same,
the Supreme Court merely attacked a straw man.... For if one's definition
of these terms means that, in concrete cases, the existence of a pattern almost
always necessitates the existence of an enterprise, the question still remains
whether such an interpretation of the Act is satisfactory.").
40 The facts of the case are set out in the First Circuit's opinion, United
States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 908-09 (1st Cir. 1980).
41 See Lynch, supra note 14, at 704.
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tions-in-fact. Although the test purports to require an ongoing
organization and continuity, these elements are quite hollow in
§ 1962(c) prosecutions, where enterprise and pattern often
coalesce.42 If the enterprise is defined in part, if not exclusive-
ly, by the predicate acts its "members" commit, Turkette's first
two elements are established simply by proof that the crimes oc-
curred over a prolonged period.
D. RESTRICTIONS ON RICO
1. Judicial Reluctance to Limit RICO
The RICO statute offers no general limitations on RICO's
breadth. In order to limit RICO, courts must either strictly
construe the Turkette elements of association-in-fact or devise
other limits on the breadth of the enterprise concept. This
section discusses the various judicial attempts to restrict the
broad application of RICO associations-in-fact.
One way that federal courts may avoid broadly applying
RICO to criminal associations-in-fact is by narrowly construing
Turkette's elements: an ongoing organization/common pur-
pose,' a continuing unit, and proof that the enterprise is sepa-
42 A hypothetical illustrates how much the test will permit. Assume A sets
fire to B's business, at B and C's request, to collect insurance money. C
assists B in covering up the arson and collecting the proceeds. Over the next
few years, A commits a variety of crimes, usually by himself, some of which
fall within § 1961(1)'s list of racketeering activities. B is involved in one of
these crimes. Three years later, A again commits arson, this time for E and
with E's assistance, when C recommends A's services. Under Turkette, A
arguably masterminds a criminal association-in-fact, with C in charge of
solicitation. The ongoing organization and continuity requirements are
established by the fact that the predicate acts occurred over a five year period.
In addition, under Turkette proof of the enterprise (A and C's structure) is
arguably separate and distinct from proof of the pattern (the commission of
crimes). Why should A and C face RICO's heightened sanctions? This article
argues that such loose confederations should not face prosecution under RICO.
Although A may be a career criminal, he is not part of a sophisticated criminal
network unassailable under existing state or federal law. He does not pose
the same sort of threat RICO seeks to redress.
' Although Turkette used the term "ongoing organization," subsequent
courts have seized upon the opinion's "common purpose" language, given that
proof of such a common purpose, by nature, satisfies the ongoing organization-
al requirement. See Thomas O'Neill, Functions of Enterprise, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 646, 713 (1989); United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir.
1981) ("Critical to the charge and proof of the existence of an associated-in-fact
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rate and distinct from the pattern." It is not difficult to prove
that a common purpose or an ongoing organization existed: the
state only has to prove something as general as a desire to
make money.' In United States v. Perholtz,' for example,
the prosecutor alleged that the enterprise "associated in fact to
unjustly enrich themselves" by obtaining government contracts
through bribery and fraud. Most criminal conspiracies involve
a desire to make money.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Riccobene4' stated
that to prove an ongoing organization, the prosecutor must show
that a "structure exists within the group for the making of
decisions, whether it be hierarchal or consensual. There must
be some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of
the group on an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, basis."'
Despite this language, thus far, courts have not rigidly inter-
preted Turkette's ongoing organization element.
Similarly, courts have not used the continuing unit element
of Turkette to narrow the definition of an association-in-fact.
Prosecutors can prove this requirement by showing the presence
of the organization over a period of time.49 Since the pattern
and enterprise tend to coalesce in § 1962(c) illicit association
cases, the continuing nature of the unit may be inferred from
the fact that the predicate acts occurred over a period of time.
If the association committed the predicate offenses over time,
then there was a continuing unit.
In addition, the continuing unit element does little to
restrict RICO's breadth because an association-in-fact may
substantially change its membership over time and still function
enterprise under § 1962(c) is charge and proof of a common purpose for which
the individuals alleged to constitute the enterprise associated themselves.").
4452 U.S. 576, 580-83 (1981).
41 See O'Neill, supra note 43, at 713.
4842 F.2d 343, 351 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988). See also
In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (association-in-fact may have a singular purpose without losing status
as enterprise).
47 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
4Id. at 222.
41 See O'Neill, supra note 43, at 713; see also United States v. Mazzei, 700
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983) (associates functioned as a continuing unit during 1978-
79 Boston College basketball season); United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889
(9th Cir.) (continuity proven by length of association and recruitment efforts),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 993 (1982).
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as a continuing unit.5" People within the association can
change roles, as long as the overall enterprise remains intact in
general form and purpose.5' The Eighth Circuit, in United
States v. Bledsoe,52 elaborated on the ability of an association-
in-fact to evolve over time:
What is essential.., is that there is some continuity of
both structure and personality. For example the opera-
tives in a prostitution ring may change through time,
but the various roles which the old and new individuals
perform remain the same. But if an entirely new set of
people begin to operate the ring, it is not the same
enterprise as it was before.5"
In restricting RICO's breadth, courts most frequently hold
that the proof of the pattern and enterprise must be separate
and distinct from that of the pattern of racketeering in which it
engages.' Turkette explained that the proof of pattern and
enterprise may overlap, but that "enterprise at all times re-
mains a separate element which must be proved by the Govern-
ment."55
Courts have interpreted this requirement in varied ways.
Some permit the proof of pattern and enterprise to coalesce to a
significant degree.56  For example, in United States v.
" See United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 631-32 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 223 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
"' See Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223 (proof of continuing unit requires that
"each person perform a role in the group consistent with the organizational
structure... and which furthers the activities of the organization.").
52 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982).
53 Id. at 665.
" For a detailed discussion of Turkette's third requirement and subsequent
judicial treatment, see Vitter, supra note 39.
55 452 U.S. at 583.
" See, e.g., United States v. Qauod, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 856 (1983); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981).
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Bagaric,57 the Second Circuit essentially collapses the two
elements into one:
We have upheld application of RICO to situations
where the enterprise was, in effect, no more than the
sum of the predicate racketeering acts.... [I]t is
logical to characterize any associative group in terms of
what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its
structure.58
However, other courts have followed Thrkette more
faithfully and demanded that the evidence of the enterprise be
more distinct from that used to prove the pattern.59 For exam-
ple, the Bledsoe court stated that "the enterprise must be more
than an informal group created to perpetrate the acts of racke-
teering."6 The court explained that absent a stringent "sepa-
rate and distinct" requirement, the enterprise element would be
read out of the statute:
[A]n enterprise cannot simply be the undertaking of the
acts of racketeering, neither can it be the minimal
association which surrounds these acts. Any two crimi-
nal acts will necessarily be surrounded by some degree
of organization and no two individuals will ever jointly
perpetrate a crime without some degree of association
apart from the commission of the crime itself.
6
'
The Eighth Circuit stated a third necessary element of an
association-in-fact: an ascertainable structure separate and
distinct from the structure inherent in the commission of predi-
57 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
' Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted); see Vitter, supra note 39, at 1426 (de-
scribing the Second Circuit position as the extreme version of the majority
approach to the separate and distinct requirement).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 932 (1988); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
6 Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 663.
61 Id. at 664. The court also reasoned that the relatively more serious
penalties imposed by RICO suggested that the statute was not intended to
apply to "simple conspiracies to perpetrate the predicate acts of racketeering."
Id.
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cate offenses. A prosecutor could prove structure with evidence
of a diverse pattern of crimes or an infrastructure or system of
authority beyond that needed simply for the commission of the
acts. As an example, the court cited the command structure of
a Mafia family and the hierarchy and division of profits within
a prostitution ring.
62
The Bledsoe court found no enterprise distinct from the
individual cooperatives used to perpetrate the predicate
offenses. Requiring such truly distinct proof would both prevent
"enterprise" from being read out of the statute and ensure that
RICO's application to illegitimate enterprises would be
restricted to sophisticated organized crime. Although the
government's proof revealed "loose and discontinuous patterns
of associations and agreements," there was no evidence of the
requisite structure, continuity, or common purpose.6 1 Many of
the defendants performed tasks for several of the cooperatives,
but these roles did not constitute the pieces of a larger structure
apart from the pattern of racketeering activity.
Bledsoe relied on a prior Eighth Circuit decision, United
States v. Anderson," in placing significant limits on the appli-
cation of RICO to associations-in-fact. In Anderson, the court
required that an alleged enterprise delineate an association
"substantially different" from the acts underlying the pattern.65
What constitutes "substantially different"? How much in
addition to the organization inherent in the commission of
predicate acts is necessary to satisfy the "ascertainable struc-
ture" element? Anderson held that enterprise would include
only associations with ascertainable structures existing to
maintain operations "directed toward an economic goal" apart
from the predicate acts. 66 Anderson represents perhaps the
farthest that a court has gone in trying to restrict the applica-
tion of RICO to associations-in-fact.67 Anderson essentially
reads enterprise to encompass only legitimate entities by requir-
ing an economic goal distinct from the pattern. Bledsoe only
required an ascertainable structure distinct from the pattern.
62 Id. at 665.
6 Id. at 667.
626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
6 Id. at 1365.
0 Id. at 1372.
6' For a discussion of the differences within the minority view on the
"separate and distinct" requirement, see generally Vitter, supra note 39.
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Under Anderson, however, criminals who developed an hierar-
chal decision-making structure would not constitute an enter-
prise if the organization existed solely to commit the predicate
acts. This decision is a dead letter after Turkette, especially
considering that it would exclude many associations-in-fact from
prosecution.
Another Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. Lemm,"
read another twist into Turkette's language. In Lemm, several
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO and of
mail fraud for their participation in an arson ring. In finding
that an enterprise existed distinct from the pattern, the court
stated that the arson ring could have operated in the absence of
the predicate acts of mail fraud: "if we eliminate... the predi-
cate acts ... , the evidence still shows an on-going structure
which [sic] engaged in legitimate purchases and repairs of
property as well as acts of arson.""s Thus, instead of focusing
on the ascertainable structure that Bledsoe spoke of, the court
addressed the nature of activity outside the predicate acts. This
approach is proper insofar as it looks to what would remain in
the absence of the predicate acts. However, if it requires re-
maining criminal activity outside the predicate acts, as one
observer has suggested it does,70 it would drastically restrict
RICO's reach to criminals who are well-organized, albeit for a
single criminal purpose.
Most courts have rejected the stringent Eighth Circuit
requirements of enterprise, relying largely on Turkette's liberal
tone and interpretation of RICO and its legislative history.71
These courts establish that all that is needed to prove an associ-
ation-in-fact is an informal criminal network, not the more
formal ascertainable structure envisaged by Anderson. For
example, Riccobene noted that although an association-in-fact
need not have a function completely unrelated to the pattern, it
must have:
680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
69 Id. at 1201.
70 Vitter, supra note 39, at 1434-36.
7' See, e.g., United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1985),
modified on other grounds, 778 F.2d 673 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1110 (1986); United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
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an existence beyond that which is necessary merely to
commit each of the acts charged as predicate racketeer-
ing offenses. The function of overseeing and coordinat-
ing the commission of several different predicate offens-
es and other activities on an on-going basis is adequate
to satisfy the separate existence requirement.72
Aside from elaborating on the basic Turkette criterion, some
courts have devised other limitations on the scope of associa-
tions-in-fact. One such criteria is "enterprise continuity," a
requirement previously adopted by the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits. The requirement originates in Sedima's "continuity plus
relationship" interpretation of pattern.73  In Beck v.
Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co.,74 the Second Circuit dis-
missed a complaint for lack of "enterprise continuity." The
alleged enterprise had only "one straightforward, short-lived
goal": the commission of the fraud giving rise to the predicate
acts.75 The court approved this new element because within
the Fifth Circuit, two predicate acts were still deemed sufficient
to establish a pattern;76 thus, enterprise continuity limited
RICO's application where pattern, as interpreted, could not.77
Thomas O'Neill clarifies the difference between enterprise
continuity and Turkette's continuing unit/ongoing organization
requirements:
Nothing in Turkette says the enterprise must be a
continuing unit. It simply must function like a continu-
ing organization for the duration of the pattern. The
7
'
2 United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 849 (1983). Although this requirement of a separate existence falls short
of Anderson's "economic goal," Riccobene does mandate more than the majority
rule enunciated in Turkette and applied in cases such as Mazzei and Errico.
7' Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Actually, enterprise
continuity first appeared in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D.
Conn. 1975), where the court noted that "even if 'enterprise' could be inter-
preted to include an unlawful venture, [it would] connote a requirement of
continuing activity." Id. at 60.
74 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
75 Id. at 51. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Montesano v. Seafirst Com-
mercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1987), adopted an enterprise continuity
requirement.
' See R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
17 See O'Neill, supra note 43, at 670 n.101, 672.
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RICO enterprise was meant to address the idea of
organization .... If the organization terminates upon
completion of the pattern of racketeering activity, it has
nonetheless functioned as a continuing unit for the
time of the predicate acts.s
Enterprise continuity would do more than simply require
ongoing organization. It would mandate a sort of perpetual life
that would effectively restrict the application of RICO to tradi-
tional organized crime, which clearly retains continuity of enter-
prise.79
Given the uncertainty underlying this limitation, the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed its position in United States v. Indelicatos°
and Beauford v. Helmsley.8 ' Both cases confirmed that conti-
nuity is properly an aspect of a pattern of racketeering, not a
RICO enterprise. Nevertheless, proof of an enterprise may be
used to establish the continuity of the pattern.8 2  Thus, the
enterprise continuity requirement survives only in the Fifth
Circuit;' an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that
continuity refers only to the pattern of predicate acts.84
78 d. at 672 n.109.
79 d.
80 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
81 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
82 See id. at 1391.
' See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 583
(5th Cir. 1992); Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1991) ("This
association ... lacks the continuity required of RICO enterprises. The
association as alleged has one short-term goal - the destruction of [plaintiffs]
medical practice - and presumably will disband upon the attainment of that
goal. There is, as a result, nothing linking the members of the association to
one another except the commission of the predicate criminal acts.").
I Another criterion adopted by several courts is the requirement of a
profit-seeking purpose. This limitation is not terribly significant, as the
financial purpose can be related to either the enterprise or the pattern of
racketeering activity. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
However, this limitation'does little to prevent the application of RICO to ad
hoc criminal conspiracies, as all such criminal confederations will engage in
predicate acts producing economic gain, unless the acts are purely political in
nature.
Another limitation is the "person-enterprise" rule that prohibits the
defendant from being the same entity as the enterprise in § 1962(c) cases.
However, the rule as developed has no applicability to ad hoc conspiracies, as
associations-in-fact are not considered persons for purposes of the rule. In
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Recently, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
§ 1962(c) by conditioning liability under that provision on
participation in the operation or management of the enterprise
itself.85 More importantly, the Court indicated a move away
from reliance on RICO's limitless language in the face of clearly
contrary legislative history. In addressing RICO's liberal
construction clause, the Court stated:
This clause obviously seeks to ensure that Congress'
intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of
the statute, but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to
new purposes that Congress never intended. 6
This approach supports the position asserted herein that courts
should strictly construe associations-in-fact under § 1962(c) by
referring to the purposes Congress sought to further.
2. Legislative Efforts to Restrict RICO
In addition, Congress has considered steps to revise RICO,
although it has not fundamentally changed the statute. Periodi-
cally, proponents for reform call for Congress to amend RICO.
Most of the criticism focuses on civil RICO, where the greatest
abuses are perceived." This does not mean that criminal
reform is unimportant, however, because every civil RICO
charge requires an underlying criminal violation. That is, any
suit that a private plaintiff could bring could also be prosecuted
by the government.8" If private citizens can bring abusive civil
suits, so may federal prosecutors. Thus, despite the prevailing
focus on civil RICO, issues pertaining to criminal RICO remain
as important.
The most relevant proposed amendments were raised in
1991, when Representative William D. Hughes (D.-N.J.) pro-
fact, oftentimes corporations and other persons try to recharacterize them-
selves as associations-in-fact to escape the purview of the rule. See Miranda
v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991); Palmer v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 945 F.2d 1371 (6th Cir. 1991).
1 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1164 (1993).
8 Id. at 1172.
87 See H.R. 511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
' Organized Crime in America: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings].
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posed modifications to the definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity."8 9 The bill, which passed the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, but was never voted on or discussed by the full House,
would have changed two things. First, it would require that the
two acts of racketeering activity be "related to one another or to
a common external organizing principle and constitute or pose
a threat of continuing racketeering."90  Second, it would add
that two or more acts which are part of a single episode consti-
tute a single racketeering act.91
These amendments clearly would have promoted the posi-
tion advanced by this article by indirectly restricting the scope
of enterprise. By requiring a "common external organizing
principle" and a continuing threat, the amendments would
restrict the statute's reach. Turkette requires an ongoing
organization or common purpose, continuity of structure, and
separateness of pattern and enterprise. The proposed amend-
ments appear to incorporate all of these elements. Further, the
proposed bill would properly prevent one incident during which
several predicate offenses occurred from constituting more than
one racketeering act.92
II. PRESCRIPTION - WIAT COURTS AND
CONGRESS SHOULD DO
A. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF ENTERPRISE
The enterprise concept serves several crucial roles and
functions. According to Thomas O'Neill, "enterprise" serves four
distinct roles in RICO litigation: perpetrator, victim, prize, and
instrument.93 When prosecutors allege an illicit association-in-
fact, the enterprise is usually the perpetrator, or the entity
committing the pattern of racketeering activity.94 When in-
89 See H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
9Id. at 2.
91 Id.
92 If a defendant murdered three people at once, the killings would com-
prise only one racketeering activity, not three.
93 See O'Neill, supra note 43, at 673-77.
However, the perpetrator may also be a legitimate entity. See, e.g.,
Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987)
(enterprise invested money it received from its own pattern of racketeering
activity back into its own operation).
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5 96stead the enterprise is a victim,9  prize," or instrument,97
the RICO count is based on sections 1962(a) or 1962(b). These
latter roles are implicated when organized crime infiltrates
legitimate enterprises. In contrast, because illicit associations-
in-fact are formed to commit certain acts, it is unlikely that they
will serve any of these roles.
In addition, the enterprise concept promotes three key
prosecutorial objectives: federal jurisdiction, joinder of offenses
and parties, and the selection of appropriate remedies.9 " Fed-
eral jurisdiction will exist where the enterprise and pattern of
racketeering activity affect interstate commerce.99 Since many
of the predicate offenses are state law offenses, achieving
federal jurisdiction is one of RICO's more troubling aspects.'00
RICO can apply to defendants who- commit only common law
crimes, so long as some informal illicit organization sufficient to
comprise an association-in-fact exists. This far-reaching power
of federal courts to enter areas traditionally left to state law
9 An enterprise is a victim when it is harmed by the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, as in Sun Say. & Loan v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987),
where the savings and loan institution sued as a victim under § 1962(c),
alleging that its president had run its affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity, namely mail fraud. See also United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352,
1362 (2d Cir.) (noting that enterprise can serve as a victim), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 810 (1989).
" When an enterprise is captured or infiltrated through a pattern of
racketeering, the indictment will include § 1962(a) or § 1962(b) charges, with
the enterprise serving the "prize" role. See, e.g., United States v. McNary, 620
F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (defendant used status as mayor to channel fumds
illegally into several businesses he owned, which served as the enterprise in
a § 1962(a) count).
" An enterprise becomes an instrument or tool when it permits the
defendant to commit the predicate acts comprising the pattern. See United
States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.) (tavern employed to disguise
defendant's illegal activities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
98 See O'Neill, supra note 43, at 677-704.
9 This impact on interstate commerce is required since RICO is a federal
criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (all substantive offenses require
that interstate commerce be affected). This impact need not be significant.
See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A minimal
effect on interstate commerce satisfies this jurisdictional element."), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982).
100 See 18 U.S.C § 1961(1)(A) (1988), which lists as racketeering activity
"any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law ......
RESTRICTING RICO's ENTERPRISE
enforcement arguably violates well-established principles of
federalism. Thus far, prosecutors have not employed RICO in
such an abusive manner;1"' prosecutions typically reach only
cases where at least one of the charged predicate acts is a
federal offense. °2
A second function enterprise serves is the joinder of parties
and offenses. Joinder of persons is permissible under current
federal law, 10 3 but RICO effectively broadens these provisions.
In particular, in criminal cases, § 1962(c) permits joinder of any
person "employed by or associated with" the enterprise.' Not
only does the enterprise concept allow for joinder of parties as.
defendants under a RICO count, but it may allow joinder of non-
RICO defendants in the same indictment.' The 5th Circuit
101 In fact, the Department of Justice in its official guidelines counsels
against such far-reaching application of RICO. See GUIDELINES, supra note
11, § 9-110.200 ("One purpose of these guidelines is to reemphasize the
principle that the primary responsibility for enforcing state laws rests with the
state concerned."); id. § 9-110.330 (RICO indictments should not issue where
the predicate acts consist of only state law offenses).
102 Section 1961 enumerates federal laws whose violation may serve as the
predicate acts in a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B)-(E) (1988). However, in United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), the charged predicate offenses
were solely state offenses. In Licavoli, an organized crime leader and his
accomplice were charged with conspiracy to murder and the actual murder of
a rival gang leader, both state law offenses. Without RICO's enterprise, the
defendants could not have been tried in federal court.
l"SIn criminal cases, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow joinder
of defendants only when the parties participate "in the same act or transaction
or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offens-
es." FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
'o4 This standard is broader than Rule 8(b) of the Criminal Rules. Indeed,
claims based on § 1962(c) loosen "the statutory requirements for what consti-
tutes joint criminal activity... Congress limited the force of Rule 8(b) in
such situations." United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
105 Although RICO defendants may be joined by virtue of the language of
§ 1962(c), non-RICO defendants may be included in the indictment if the
crimes they allegedly committed were in connection with the enterprise.
[A] defendant ... not named in a ... RICO count ... may be
charged in a separate count, in the same indictment, if he is alleged
to have participated in the same series of acts or transactions that
constituted the... RICO offense, despite the fact that his participa-
tion may have been too limited to permit his being included as a...
co-racketeer.
Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
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in United States v. Elliot0 6 recognized the breadth of joinder
possible - in fact, intended - under RICO:
In enacting RICO, Congress found that "organized
crime continues to grow" in part "because the sanctions
and remedies available to the government are unneces-
sarily limited in scope and impact." ... Against this
background, we are convinced that, through RICO,
Congress intended to authorize the single prosecution
of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy by replacing
the inadequate "wheel" and "chain" rationales with a
new statutory concept: the enterprise.'
Under § 1962(d), RICO's conspiracy provision, the prosecu-
tion must still establish an overall objective, which is satisfied
if a particular defendant knew of the general nature of the
enterprise and the fact that it extended beyond his individual
role.'0 8 The breadth of joinder is especially significant in asso-
ciation-in-fact cases, where a defendant need only be "employed
by or associated with" the enterprise. Although Turkette re-
quires proof of a "common purpose" to establish an association-
in-fact, this does not entail an explicit agreement to violate
RICO's substantive agreements. Instead, establishing a com-
mon purpose is as simple as alleging that the associates hoped
to make money'0° or sought to commit the predicate acts
charged."' As Elliot recognized, the primary tool for achiev-
ing joinder of persons is the "enterprise" requirement in RICO's
substantive offenses.
Similarly, enterprise allows joinder of offenses."'
106 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
107 Id. at 902.
108 See United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 982 (1989); see also United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 619 (11th Cir.
1990) (RICO conviction where individual did not know all co-conspirators or
details of the enterprise, and failed to participate in all of enterprise's activi-
ties).
"
06 See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988).
11 See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1979) (bur-
glars comprise enterprise as association-in-fact, the purpose of which was "to
plan and commit robberies, to carry away stolen goods and to divide them
among themselves ...."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
... Joinder of offenses is made possible by the "acquisition, establishment,
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Although current federal rules permit joinder of offenses,"
the broad definition of "enterprise" assures joinder in illicit
enterprise cases because the predicate acts underlying the
enterprise will fall within "the same series of acts or transac-
tions." The enterprise concept binds together wholly separate
offenses committed by the same defendant or group of defen-
dants. The enterprise, whether a legitimate entity or an illegiti-
mate association, furnishes the keystone for relatedness."'
A last role that enterprise serves is the prosecutorial selec-
tion of remedies. RICO's sanctions are far-reaching. For
example, violation of a substantive RICO provision may result
in significant fines and a 20-year prison term."14 RICO's more
innovative remedies - criminal forfeiture and civil injunctive
relief - also flow directly from the enterprise requirement.
What is surrendered under RICO's criminal forfeiture
provisions depends on how the prosecutor frames the indict-
ment. Although the interests implicated by sections
1963(a)(1)(3) are not limited solely to interests in an enter-
or operation" language of § 1962(a), the "acquire or maintain" language of
§ 1962(b), and the "conduct the affairs" language of § 1962(c). See O'Neill,
supra note 43, at 688.
12 See FED. R. C0IM. P. 8(a) (offenses must be of the same character or
based on the same act or transaction, or of multiple acts connected together or
comprising a common plan); FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) ("A party asserting a claim
to relief... may join... as many claims ... as he has against an opposing
party.").
113 See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir.) ("RICO is
capable of providing for the linkage in one proceeding of a number of other-
wise distinct crimes and/or conspiracies through the concept of the enterprise
conspiracy."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). In civil cases, such a violation may result in
treble damages payable to any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a § 1962 violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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prise,"' identifying the exact relation between the enterprise
and the ill-acquired interest facilitates effective forfeiture.
The enterprise concept also facilitates application of RICO's
expansive civil remedies contained in § 1964(a). Among the
powers granted to courts under that section are: ordering the
divestiture of any interest in an enterprise; imposing restric-
tions on the future activities of a person, including prohibiting
him from engaging in the same type of conduct the enterprise
engaged in; and ordering dissolution or reorganization of the
enterprise." 6 All of these powers require the prosecutor to
carefully frame the enterprise. Since the enterprise element is
easy to satisfy, § 1964(a) could permit the dismantling of a
criminal infrastructure, or whatever entities the defendants
have infiltrated or exploited."'
Examining the roles that enterprise plays does more than
afford insight into prosecutorial strategy and RICO's intricacies.
It suggests that the enterprise concept is not an inevitable way
of addressing crime, that its inclusion in the statute reflects
115 See Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding that
§ 1963(a)(1) "interest" refers to any interest, whether or not an enterprise, so
long as it was acquired in violation of RICO's substantive provisions). Under
Rusello, an enterprise could be the interest forfeited under § 1963(a)(1) (such
as where the enterprise is acquired as a prize), but it is more likely to divest
the convicted defendant of his interests obtained through the pattern of
racketeering activity. On the other hand, § 1963(a)(2) addresses the enter-
prise, not the pattern of racketeering activity. See, e.g., United States v.
Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir. 1987) (Section 1962(a)(2) "focuses on the
enterprise, not the specific racketeering activity.... It would therefore seem
irrelevant.., whether (a)(2) interests were directly related to the racketeering
activity of which the defendant was convicted.").
116 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
i1 For example, in United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683
F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1988), the government,
alleging ten separate enterprises, sought to divest the family members of their
interests in those enterprises and to enjoin their subsequent association with
the enterprises and among themselves. Id. at 1419. The district court refused
to dismiss based on defendant's objections to the government's request for
relief, noting the broad discretion granted to trial courts in exercising
§ 1964(a) and (b)'s equitable powers. Id. at 1453. Bonanno indicates RICO's
unrealized remedial potential, as well as the central role enterprise could play:
By breaking down the Bonanno Family's alleged operations into
identifiable enterprises .... the government might be able to
eradicate the entire range of activities of a mob family. Without the
flexibility of the RICO enterprise concept, the government could not
undertake such an ambitious legal maneuver.
O'Neill, supra note 43, at 704.
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what it does, not what it means. Enterprise is the linchpin that
allows prosecutors to achieve jurisdiction, joinder and far-reach-
ing remedies. Given the difficulty in defining organized crime,
enterprise as applied to legitimate businesses and entities
furnishes prosecutors with a target that facilitates their efforts.
By including legal enterprises in RICO, Congress did much
more than express its concerns about organized crime infiltra-
tion of legitimate society. Instead, it sought to provide some-
thing as verifiable as a corporation or a labor union to provide
direction for prosecutorial efforts against criminal syndicates.
The enterprise requirement clearly helps prosecutors attack
organized crime in a manner that they could not before, but in
the process pulls "ordinary" criminals within the statute's reach.
In the absence of the enterprise requirement, loosely-affilated
criminal groups would face prosecution only under existing state
or federal law. A large portion of RICO cases involving
§ 1962(c) and illicit associations-in-fact deal with "strikingly
ordinary criminal conspiracies.""'8  Furthermore, § 1962(c)'s
broad language permits joinder of parties who are merely
"associated" with the enterprise, which in turn may be estab-
lished by an agreement to commit the predicate acts alleged.
B. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONSTRUING
"ENTERPRISE" NARROWLY
1. Organization
Legislative history suggests that Congress hoped to attack
traditional criminal syndicates because of the danger inherent
in their organization. However, stating that Congress sought to
attack "organization" without addressing the dangers of struc-
ture that warrant federalization of criminal offenses is not
enough. What makes organized crime more dangerous than
loosely-affiliated criminal groups?
One answer is the economic impact of organized crime when
it infiltrates legitimate businesses and acts as a drain on the
economy. When organized criminals acquire interests in or
conduct their affairs through legitimate enterprises (as antici-
pated by §§ 1962(a) and (b)), they may conduct or encourage
118 See Lynch, supra note 14, at 921. Lynch cites as examples of "small-
scale vice rings indicted under RICO" United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182
(5th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982).
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inefficient business operations. One study prepared for the
President's Commission on Organized Crime in 1986 cites
higher prices and underpayment of taxes as the primary nega-
tive impacts of organized crime on the U.S. economy." 9 High-
er prices - which result in greater profits for the tainted busi-
nesses - are often caused by threats and coercive tactics. Fur-
thermore, the study suggests that individuals associated with
organized crime report only forty percent of their income,
forcing ordinary citizens to bear a disproportionate tax bur-
den.2 ° The study concludes that organized crime reduced
aggregate U.S. output by $18.2 billion, reduced employment by
over 400,000 jobs, increased consumer prices 0.3%, and de-
creased per capita income by seventy-seven dollars.' 2 '
Donald Cressey, whose views were influential in the draft-
ing of RICO, also emphasized the importance of organization in
crime. He distinguished organized criminals from their less
structured counterparts: "the ordinary criminal is wholly preda-
tory, while the man participating in crime on a rational, system-
atic basis offers a return to the respectable members of soci-
ety."' "s Cressey also noted the tendency of individual criminal
entrepreneurs to confederate with others and stressed the
specific problems incidental to organization of criminal activi-
ties:
By joining hands, [criminals] (a) cut costs, improve
their markets, and pool capital, (b) gain monopolies on
certain of the illicit services provided in a specific
geographic area ..., (c) centralize the procedures for
stimulating the agencies of law enforcement and ad-
ministration ofjustice to overlook the illegal operations,
and (d) accumulate vast wealth which can be used to
119 Sima Fishman et al., The Income of Organized Crime, in PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ATroRNEY GENERAL: THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 413, 484-87
(1986).
120 Id. at 486.
121 Id. at 487.
' Cressey, supra note 18, 23, at 29. Cressey contends that organized
crime thrives because of the desired goods and services it provides individuals.
Furthermore, government efforts to abolish organized crime are often half-
hearted, Cressey argues, because of conflicting commitments to preserving the
wishes of citizens who demand the right to purchase illicit goods and to
adhering to traditional notions of due process towards organized criminals. Id.
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attain even wider monopolies on illicit activities, and on
legal businesses as well.'
In fact, Cressey's entire analysis addressed the organizational
structure of both Sicilian and American organized crime. His
proposals for combatting organized crime require that it be
defined precisely and attacked structurally, rather than by
focusing on the individual criminal activities. Former FBI
Director William Webster described the "badge" of organized
crime as the "effort to obtain an edge - not necessarily and
most often to the contrary, a legitimate edge."''
Furthermore, proponents of the bill feared that racketeers
could seize monopoly power through illegitimate means, which
would carry serious anti-competitive economic consequenc-
es.' Cressey noted:
The real danger is that the trend [of infiltration] will
continue to the point where syndicate rulers gain such
a degree of control that they drive supporters of free
enterprise and democracy out of "business" and then
force us to pay tribute in the form of traditional free-
doms." s
Arguably, this fear of infiltration prompted Congress to use
"enterprise" to prevent organized crime monopolization. Section
1961(4) defines enterprise largely by reference to legal entities;
arguably this signifies Congress' understanding that crimes
Id. at 30. Lynch asserts that the acquisition of a legitimate business
interest, even with dirty money, is "morally neutral, or even beneficial":
The harm to society is not in the act of infiltration - the invest-
ment of criminal proceeds - but in the acts of racketeering that
precede and follow it. Society is injured by the narcotics and
gambling businesses that are the source of criminals' profits, not by
the use of those profits to buy a laundry; any harmful result of the
latter comes not directly from the investment itself, but from the
predicted operation of the laundry by criminal means.
Lynch, supra note 14, at 689-90.
Hearings, supra note 88, at 42.
Lynch, supra note 14, at 676 (discussing Senator Hruska's character-
ization of the purpose of the bill). Hruska also expressed fear that businesses
operated by racketeers would employ "'all the techniques of violence and
intimidation' for which [they were] renowned." Id.
' See Cressey, supra note 18, 23, at 25-26.
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committed through such organizations are significantly more
serious than the same crimes committed on an individual basis.
All crime reduces economic efficiency, but due to organized
crime's scale and its infiltration of legitimate businesses, it
poses a much greater threat than loosely organized criminals.
Association-in-fact enterprises prosecuted under § 1962(c) have
not infiltrated legitimate businesses, and are thus unable to
wreak as much economic havoc as traditional organized crimi-
nals. Furthermore, an organized crime infrastructure permits
its members to commit crimes with the benefit of institutional
support. As the President's Commission on Organized Crime
noted in its report:
Organized crime is the result of the commitment,
knowledge, and activities of three components: the
criminal groups, each of which has at its core persons
tied by racial, linguistic, ethnic or other bonds; the
protectors, persons who protect the group's interests;
and specialist support, persons who knowingly render
services on an ad hoc basis to enhance the group's
interests.27
The organized crime network derives its strength not solely
from the acts of its criminal confederates; organized crime
benefits from the support of corrupt public officials, attorneys,
and businessmen. 2 ' The same is not true for loosely-affiliated
criminals such as those prosecuted under RICO in Elliot.
From a prosecutorial point of view, this is precisely the
shortcoming of traditional law enforcement: pre-existing law
did not prohibit involvement in an illicit organization unless a
broad conspiracy existed or each individual defendant engaged
in the commission of the crimes. 129  Substantive and
procedural law prior to RICO inadequately allowed for wide-
spread prosecution of traditional organized crime and well-
developed criminal infrastructures. 30 In the absence of indi-
127 Hearings, supra note 88, at 25.
Id. at 29-32.
129 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1938) (statute making
membership in a "gang" a criminal offense violates due process).
130 United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), exem-
plifies the type of case that could not have been prosecuted prior to RICO
because of its "multi-faceted" nature. For a discussion of Castellano, see
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vidualized proof linking each defendant to the acts committed,
pre-existing law focused on agreement, in contrast to enterprise,
which addresses structure.1 3' Applying RICO's far-reaching
remedies against loosely organized criminal conspiracies is
difficult to justify, given the statute's legislative history and the
relatively minor threat that such organizations pose to society.
Ad hoc conspiracies simply do not offer the sort of complex
criminal infrastructures that RICO should attempt to dismantle.
2. Adequacy of Existing State and Federal Law
Existing law is sufficient to prosecute ad hoc associations-
in-fact. As a result, RICO threatens principles of federalism.
Many of the predicate acts listed in § 1961(1) are state law
crimes that RICO allows to be tried in federal court if they meet
the federal jurisdictional hurdle of affecting interstate com-
merce.132  However, the interstate commerce requirement is
easily satisfied. 33  As a practical matter, the potential for
abuse in RICO's application to purely state law offenses may
not be troubling, as it does not appear that state sovereignty
has been infinged.' On a theoretical level, however, the
ability of prosecutors to drag into federal court cases long in the
exclusive domain of state courts is dangerous.3 5
In some cases, prosecutorial discretion is the only thing
preventing federal involvement in state law offenses. Although
the Department of Justice Guidelines state that RICO charges
should not lie if the predicate acts "consist solely and only of
Lynch, supra note 14, at 929-31.
131 See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
132 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
"a See United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985)
([Einterprise need only have a minimal impact upon interstate commerce.").
"3 See Lynch, supra note 14, at 715 ("Overfederalization of law enforce-
ment does not appear to be a pressing political concern, nor is it apparent that
prosecution of RICO offenses by federal officials threatens either rights of
individual defendants or the remaining sovereignty of the states."). Indeed,
Lynch notes that many states have adopted their own versions of RICO "to get
in on the action." Id. at 715 n.236.
"
3 But see United States v. Framento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (RICO
forbids racketeering, which is defined partially by reference to state law; this
does not mean that the statute punishes same conduct as reached by federal
law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
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state offenses," the Guidelines permit an exception where local
officials "are unlikely to investigate and prosecute otherwise
meritorious cases in which the federal government has signifi-
cant interest."'36  The meaning of this exception is unclear.
Furthermore, the Guidelines make no provision for bringing
RICO charges where a single federal offense is charged along
with a host of state offenses. RICO does not bar such a prosecu-
tion, even though the state offenses and the single federal
violation could be tried separately. In such cases, RICO's
application would preclude states from determining for them-
selves how to enforce their laws and punish those who violate
them.
For example, in United States v. Aleman,"3 ' two
defendants were tried under RICO for committing three robber-
ies in Indiana and Illinois. Federal jurisdiction existed because
the defendants transported robbery proceeds across state
lines.'38 Although trying the case in federal court was proper
under RICO, the statute allowed prosecution by federal authori-
ty of the robberies illegal under state law, despite the fact that
state officials possessed a significant interest in prosecuting the
cases themselves. Federal officials still could have vindicated
their interests by prosecuting the defendants for violations of
federal law, while leaving the robbery prosecutions to the states
whose laws were violated. However, RICO permits the federal-
ization of these state law offenses through its jurisdictional and
joinder provisions.
Aside from federalism concerns, in most association-in-fact
cases existing federal or state law is sufficient to prosecute
defendants. RICO provides the prosecutorial benefit of trying
all the offenses together, which allows them to cast the shadow
of the mysterious criminal enterprise over all the individual
defendants. As already suggested, this approach is justified
when diverse criminal syndicates are responsible for crimes
because existing procedural and substantive law is unable to
handle such trials. An example is United States v.
Ruggiero,3 9 where members of the Bonanno organized crime
family were charged under RICO for violations of various state
... GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 9-110.300.
137 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
'3 Id. at 301-02. Additionally, federal firearms charges were available
against one of the defendants. Id. at 301.
139 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
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and federal offenses, including gambling, narcotics, murder and
theft. Achieving a unified prosecution to attack the organiza-
tion would have been impossible without RICO, and prosecutors
would have to settle for piecemeal trials at the state and federal
levels. In such cases, RICO is applied to further the purpose of
eradicating organized crime networks and restricting their
infiltration of legitimate entities. 4 °
However, in § 1962(c) cases where enterprise is defined by
the predicate acts of its members - as in Thrkette - existing
law suffices for prosecution. Even if a variety of offenses are
committed, they can be tried under the state or federal statutes
that make them criminal in the first place. Where require-
ments for joinder are satisfied - that is, when the events are
related to each other - some of the offenses may be tried in
conjunction. Even without suchjoinder, nothing prevents either
state or federal authorities from proceeding against all or some
of the defendants for violations of their laws. In the absence of
any true organization, defendants in such association-in-fact
cases should be punished for the crimes they have committed,
whether federal narcotics offenses or state murder -charges.
They should not face megatrials in federal courts solely because
imaginative prosecutors cast them as a criminal association-in-
fact under Turkette's potentially hollow test.
3. RICO's Resemblance in Application to a Status Crime
Furthermore, given how little it takes to be "employed by or
associated with" an enterprise,4  § 1962(c), as applied to
wholly illegitimate associations, looks frighteningly like a status
crime. By being associated with persons who commit the
charged predicate offenses, a defendant who participates in only
a few of the less significant offenses may be tried in conjunction
with the others and be subject to the same penalties. 42 Ger-
ald Lynch, an outspoken critic of RICO, argues that the statute
criminalizes the status of being a gangster, whether in tradi-
tional organized crime or in a more "loosely-affiliated criminal
140 See also United States v. Persico, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
141 See Elliot, 571 F.2d at 903.
' See Lynch, supra note 14, at 703.
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combine."'" Lynch asserts that RICO violates the deeply
ingrained transaction-based model of crime.'" Sections
1962(a)-(b) satisfy this requirement as they involve discrete
transactions with ascertainable enterprises. Section 1962(c) as
applied to illegitimate associations, on the other hand, does not
address specific acts but rather a course of conduct over an
extended period of time." In effect, a jury in a RICO case is
determining much more than whether certain criminal acts
occurred; "it is being asked to impose a conceptual construct on
the events that it finds took place."' Because the predicate
acts are already subject to prosecution under existing law,
participation in the enterprise is the sole basis for the enhanced
penalties under RICO. In essence, membership in a criminal
association, whether traditional organized crime or an ad hoc
organization, constitutes a new substantive offense under RICO.
This is not to say that in most cases RICO punishes mere
status, because a defendant still must engage in some activity
sufficient to satisfy RICO's requirements. "Status" implies both
a condition or state beyond one's control, such as alcoholism,
and the absence of affirmative conduct. Membership in an
organized crime family or a well-developed criminal syndicate
involves neither. To be convicted under RICO, one must be
associated with a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of
at least two predicate acts. RICO penalizes activity, not status.
The fear of RICO punishing status is greater, however, in
the criminal association-in-fact context. If courts allow the
enterprise and pattern elements to coalesce, the enterprise
giving rise to RICO liability is little more than the predicate
acts constituting the pattern. In addition, the ease with which
§ 1962(c)'s "employed by or associated with" standard can be
met allows people on the periphery of the "organization" to be
prosecuted to the same extent as traditional "gangsters."
Applied in this manner, RICO comes perilously close to crimina-
lizing association with criminals. In addition, unlike conspiracy
law, RICO does not require proof of a single agreement. Nor
need the defendant be aware that he was participating in the
4 Id. at 706.
'44 See id. at 932-45.
145 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
146 Lynch, supra note 14, at 943.
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affairs of an enterprise.'47 This also fosters the danger of
"guilt by association."'
Furthermore, § 1962(c) criminal prosecutions permit lesser
participants in the course of conduct to be punished as heavily
as the masterminds. Clearly associations-in-fact may change
their personnel, so that a defendant who participated in a few
predicate acts early on in the enterprise's existence may be
prosecuted under RICO because other defendants continued to
commit crimes through the enterprise. Joinder would prejudice
such peripheral defendants when the other members of the
enterprise have committed more serious predicate offenses.
Prosecutors may try to lump all the members of the enterprise
together in a common prosecution, which might create the
impression of a vast criminal gang, even though certain defen-
dants were only bit players. In a sense, prosecutors may impute
the actions of all the defendants to even the smallest player in
the enterprise.1
49
4. RICO's Recidivist Nature
Another criticism of RICO as applied to illegitimate associa-
tions-in-fact is that it acts as a recidivist statute. It does this by
imposing far-reaching penalties on conduct already prosecuted
under existing state and federal law where the pattern of
racketeering is conducted through the affairs of an enterprise.
Prosecutors may try defendants under RICO where convictions
have already been secured for the charged predicate offenses
that establish the pattern. 150  Courts have recognized that
"Congress, in enacting RICO, sought to allow the separate
prosecution and punishment of predicate offenses and a subse-
quent RICO offense based in large part on those predicate
offenses."15'
The threat of recidivism is greatest in the context of illicit
associations-in-fact, where the pattern and enterprise elements
14 See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 961 (1981).
148 United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir. 1982).
149 See Lynch, supra note 14, at 703.
.
50 See United States v. Black, 759 F.2d 71, 73-74 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
151 United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D.C.N.Y.), affd, 774
F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985).
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tend to merge. In United States v. Bledsoe, the Eighth Circuit
warned of this potential implication:
We are satisfied that RICO was not designed to serve
as a recidivist statute, imposing heavier sentences for
crimes which are already punishable under other
statutes. The Act was not intended to be a catchall
reaching all concerted action of two or more criminals
involving two or more of the designated crimes.15 2
Nonetheless, RICO allows prosecutors to incorporate prior
convictions as part of the substantive offense under § 1962(c).
The pattern is established by predicate acts, for some of which
the defendant may have served time. As already suggested, in
§ 1962(c) criminal association-in-fact cases, the enterprise is
defined by reference to the acts committed by its members, not
by any formal or informal organization. Thus, in such cases,
RICO creates a "new" offense of racketeering that has the effect
of allowing convictions of a defendant for conduct for which he
has already been punished.5 '
5. Erosion of Distinction Between Pattern and Enterprise
Underlying many of the above arguments is the danger of
allowing the distinction between pattern and enterprise to erode
in association-in-fact cases, despite Turkette's protests to the
contrary. Even though Turkette warned of the danger of this
erosion, its facts suggest that the Court misapplied its own
standard. As Gerald Lynch observed:
The actual evidence in Turkette... suggests something
a good deal less organized [than required by Elliot].
152 674 F.2d at 659.
153 As one commentator notes:
RICO was not intended to be merely a recidivist statute; rather, its
greatly heightened penalties are justified by the particularly sophis-
ticated, organized brand of economic crime that the statute targets.
If an enterprise is found with every pattern, however, "garden
variety" criminals will face RICO's heightened penalties for merely
committing two or more crimes rather than for committing them in
a particularly organized or routinized, and thus more dangerous,
manner.
Vitter, supra note 39, at 1427-28.
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Granted that Turkette himself had made crime into a
full-time livelihood, his "organization" seems to have
consisted of a couple of people with whom he committed
robberies from time to time, and a few others he re-
cruited to help when he was asked to arrange a few
fires. It is not immediately clear why Turkette and his
cronies should be subject to any greater punishment
... [than] any other criminals guilty of multiple
crimes. 154
Where the association-in-fact is defined in terms of the
predicate acts committed by its members, the enterprise is what
the enterprise does.'55 The predicate acts need not be related
to any single transaction or event as long as they are committed
through the affairs of an ongoing organization, either formal or
informal.'56 This "organization" in turn can be interpreted
very loosely. The glue that binds the members of the associa-
tion-in-fact is the pattern of racketeering activity, for this
pattern defines the association's purpose."' In addition, a
broad interpretation of association-in-fact essentially removes
that element from the statute, meaning that the prosecution
focuses only on the predicate acts constituting the pattern. As
a result, RICO can apply to nearly anyone who commits the
predicate acts with other people, even if they are not organized
in any detectable manner. Courts can mitigate the problems
addressed above by simply stating the Turkette test and allow-
ing the two elements to coalesce.
C. HOW TO LIMIT "ENTERPRISE" AND RICO's BREADTH
1. Prosecutorial Discretion
Congress and the federal courts have done little to restrict
RICO's application to traditional organized crime or sophisticat-
ed criminal conspiracies. Generally, prosecutors have not
' See Lynch, supra note 14, at 705.
1 One student observer noted that "an association-in-fact is what the
pleader makes it, so long as the Turkette requirements are met." See O'Neill,
supra note 43, at 664.
1'6See Lynch, supra note 14, at 703.
' See, e.g., Elliot, 571 F.2d at 895, where the purposes of the alleged
enterprise were the commission of the predicate acts charged.
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abused RICO's applicability to loosely-affiliated criminal enter-
prises. Given the limited government resources and the rela-
tively lesser amounts that can be captured through criminal
forfeiture from ad hoc conspiracies, prosecutorial discretion
serves as an extremely valuable check on the broad application
of RICO. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent in Sedima:
[Congress] chose to confer broad statutory authority on
the Executive fully expecting that this authority would
be used only in cases in which its use was
warranted.'58
The Department of Justice has published RICO Guidelines
to assist district attorneys in deciding when to bring criminal
charges.'59 The Preface to the Guidelines states that the "pri-
mary responsibility for enforcing state laws rests with the state
concerned."' 60  The Guidelines note that Congress' primary
concern was the infiltration of organized crime into the national
economy, and that prosecutions should not be brought if far
afield from congressional purposes.' 6 ' More specifically, as a
matter of illustration, the Guidelines state that RICO charges
may be appropriate where "a diversified course of criminal
conduct involving division of labor and functional responsibili-
ties exists, for which other conspiracy statutes are inadequate
"162
Responsible use of prosecutorial discretion is necessary. It
is not sufficient, however, to ensure the virtually limitless
application of RICO. The Guidelines are not binding, but serve
merely an advisory function.1 63 As administrators and atti-
tudes within the Department of Justice change, prosecutors may
be more willing to pursue suits against loosely organized crimi-
nal associations-in-fact. In addition, convictions against small-
scale associations-in-fact may be easier to achieve than convic-
tions against traditional organized crime. As such, prosecutors
might proceed against loosely-affiliated criminal groups to
15 473 U.S. 479, 503 (1985).
159 See GUIDELINES, supra note 11.
68 Id. § 9-110.200.
161 id.
162 Id. § 9-110.311.
'
6 31 Id. § 9-110.200.
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improve their won-lost records. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the courts and Congress to restrict the scope of enterprise.
2. What Courts and Congress Should Do
Courts attempting to restrict RICO's breadth may find
themselves straining to limit its reach given the statute's broad
language and liberal construction clause. The proper course is
to construe Turkette's elements strictly. This is not sufficient,
however, because Thrkette does not restrict RICO's application
to organized crime. Thus, the best course is for Congress to
intervene and recast the statute according to its original intent.
Even if members of Congress favor RICO's broad appli-
cation,'" they should restrict the statutory definition of asso-
ciation-in-fact for the reasons discussed previously: the impor-
tance of organization, the adequacy of existing law, RICO's
potential to criminalize status, RICO's recidivist nature, and the
tendency of pattern and enterprise to coalesce in § 1962(c)
criminal association-in-fact cases.
If the problem is the excessive scope of illicit associations-
in-fact, Congress should amend § 1961(4)'s definition of enter-
prise directly, instead of redefining pattern. This is not to say
that the recent proposed amendments to pattern are unwise,
but that more fundamental modifications to the enterprise
concept are required. The better approach would be to codify
Turkette's requirements, with particular emphasis on the "sepa-
rate and distinct requirement." Congress should consider the
approach taken in United States v. Bledsoe, where the court
focused on an ascertainable structure distinct from the pattern
of activity. If the defendants created some sort of hierarchal
decision-making structure or financial structure, or developed a
division of labor, these organizational aspects would exist in
addition to the mere commission of the predicate acts. Most of
the problems outlined in this article would be mitigated if
Congress forced federal courts to prevent the concepts of enter-
prise and pattern to coalesce.
However, the problems underlying RICO run deeper than
its definition of association-in-fact. What the statute lacks is a
workable definition of organized crime. Attacking organized
14 As Gerald Lynch testified before Congress, "I doubt that most [members
of Congress] want to go back to their districts and face opponents who say that
they voted for the Pro-Racketeering Act.. . ."). Hearings, supra note 88, at
25.
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crime is exceptionally difficult when defining organized crime in
the first instance is so troublesome. Intuitive notions about
what constitutes organized crime provide only limited assistance
in drafting and implementing a statute. "Enterprise," particu-
larly in § 1962(c) prosecutions, represents an attempt to attack
the structure that organized criminals erect or infiltrate in order
to perpetrate predicate offenses. Congress correctly perceived
organization in any form - legitimate or illicit - as the true
danger of organized crime. Pattern, on the other hand, signifies
Congress' attempt to define organized crime by what it does.
The predicate offenses listed in § 1961(1) are characteristic of
organized crime, but they are also committed by common crimi-
nals on a regular basis. The delineation of predicate acts is
therefore bound to be overbroad. As such, RICO depends on a
reasoned application of its enterprise element to prevent the
prosecution of ordinary criminals under § 1962(c). Thus, when
courts construe enterprise broadly, they read out of the statute
precisely what it is designed to attack.
Is it possible to draw the line between organized crime and
loosely-affiliated criminal associations any more clearly? This
article has already advocated codifying Turkette, with particular
emphasis on the separate and distinct requirement. By doing
so, Congress would move closer to targeting the structure and
organization that make criminal syndicates so dangerous.
Developing a paradigm structure that would support a finding
of enterprise is difficult, given that criminals will not always
arrange their affairs in a predictable manner.
One way Congress might address this is by drafting a non-
exhaustive list of factors that would weigh in favor of finding an
association-in-fact. This list would represent an attempt to
move towards the Eighth Circuit's minority approach. Among
the factors indicative of an infrastructure might be a defined
division of tasks and roles, presence of cash flow and financial
structure, well-developed plans, consensual or hierarchal deci-
sion-making methods, regularized meetings, records of any sort,
routinization of affairs, diversity of operations, and capital
investment.'65 None of these factors appear necessary, al-
though some - such as any type of permanent decision-making
structure - might be sufficient depending on the circumstances.
This list focuses not on the nature of the acts committed, but on
16 Several of these factors are analyzed in Vitter, supra note 39, at 1438-
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the organization that facilitates that criminal activity. If Con-
gress adopted these elements in defining organized crime, it
would essentially analogize criminal associations-in-fact to
legitimate businesses. Such an analogy is apt; "[o]rganized
crime is a substantial threat to our society not only because it
infiltrates big business but also because it is big business.'
166
Another attribute of traditional organized crime is size.
Congress should impose a minimum floor on the number of
people who must be involved in the enterprise. At least three or
four core members or masterminds should exist, and they
should be supported by a substantial cast of regularized partici-
pants. Any numerical limit requires arbitrary line-drawing.
But the factors listed above imply that more than a handful of
people are required to develop an ascertainable structure that
presents the sort of dangers at which RICO aims. This is not to
say that two confederates could not organize their criminal
activity, but absent infiltration of legitimate entities, such a
small operation is not any more dangerous than the sum of its
predicate acts. In other words, "[wlhatever the imprecision in
our concept of organized crime, three burglars don't make
it.'
6 7
Congressional efforts which seek to modify the definition of
pattern are not the answer.'68 The current list of predicate
offenses in § 1961(1) is a fairly accurate characterization of the
types of crimes organized criminals commit. However, many
ordinary criminals commit the same acts, but are distinguished
by their lack of organization. Thus, enterprise is the statutory
section that must clarify what types of criminals are targeted.
If Congress would modify its definition of association-in-fact,
courts would evaluate illicit criminal activities in terms of the
structure underlying the predicate acts. Where this structure is
present - as evidenced by a stricter interpretation of Turkette's
requirements and a consideration of the factors listed
above - RICO's heightened sanctions are warranted.
'6 Id. at 1437.
167 Lynch, supra note 14, at 974-75.
' However, efforts that increase the number of predicate acts required
serve to promote the requirement of continuity and regularity of operations
which is indicative of organized crime.
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CONCLUSION
RICO is a valuable prosecutorial tool in attacking organized
crime; however, the statute's broad language permits its appli-
cation to loosely-affiliated criminal groups. The courts have
little justification in interpreting associations-in-fact broadly to
apply to such defendants. Ad hoc affiliations lack the requisite
organization that establishes organized crime as a danger
warranting special attention. Therefore, there is little reason to
invoke RICO's broad penal and remedial provisions. Moreover,
existing state and federal law sufficiently allow for the prosecu-
tion of such individuals. In addition, when association-in-fact is
liberally construed, RICO looks like a status offense, making
unlawful the "association" with criminals. Such interpretations
also have a recidivist effect, making a defendant's past criminal
activity part of the substantive offense.
To prevent RICO from being applied to ad hoc criminal
affiliations, courts should require that prosecutors prove an
enterprise separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeer-
ing. Although courts profess to apply this principle, they often
allow proof of the two elements to coalesce. Congress must
therefore intervene and amend the definition of enterprise.
Congress should incorporate a list of factors characteristic of
organized crime into its definition of illicit associations-in-fact.
In addition, Congress should impose a numerical minimum for
applying RICO to illicit enterprises. Such definitional modifica-
tions would prevent prosecutors from using RICO against small-
time criminal networks, while permitting them to continue
attacking RICO's true target: organized crime.
David M. Ludwickt
I B.A. 1990, Drew University; J.D. 1993, Cornell Law School.
